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STATINTL

The Change at CIA

✓ There are such strict limits to what is knowable about the Central Intelligence Agency and its workings that any discussion of Mr. Helms' departure from the directorship and Mr. Schlesinger's appointment to replace him must necessarily rest on a comparatively small store of information. Even so, one or two things are plain. And chief among these is the fact, evident from what is known about the two men themselves, that one highly qualified and eminently capable official is being replaced by another.

✓ Richard Helms has spent most of his professional life in intelligence work, and he has acquired a reputation among those qualified to judge, as a man of great honesty and tough-mindedness. The term "tough-minded" in this connection can only summon forth imaginary zither music for some people and visions of grown men running around endlessly shoving each other under trains. But Mr. Helms—unflappable, personally disinterested, and beyond the reach of political or ideological pressures where his judgment is concerned—earned his reputation for tough-mindedness in an intellectual sense. As Agency Director, he has been far less a public figure or celebrity than some of his predecessors—Allen Dulles, for example, or John McCone—evidently preferring to maintain a certain becoming obscurity. He has worked very effectively with some of his overseers on the Hill. And, if the leaked (not by CIA) material, such as the Pentagon Papers, that has been appearing in the press is any guide, he and his Agency have also served their executive branch leaders with some distinction. ✓ One gets the impression that from the presumed efficacy

of bombing the North Vietnamese to the presumed necessity of responding to every wild surmise of what the Russians were up to in nuclear weapons development, Mr. Helms has offered a practical, dispassionate and rigorously honest—if not always popular—view.

That the Congress will be pushing for some greater degree of responsiveness from the CIA in the coming session seems pretty certain. And there also is at least a chance that internal bureaucratic difficulties at the Agency will require some managerial rearrangements. In a way, solely because he comes to CIA from outside (not from up the ranks), James Schlesinger may be specially suited to take on both. But he has other qualifications. At the Rand Corporation in California, Mr. Schlesinger did analytic work that gave him more than a passing familiarity with the intelligence estimating business. At the Budget Bureau—as it was then known—in the early days of the Nixon administration he proved himself a very astute, not to say downright cold-eyed, scrutinizer of military budget requests. His brief term at the AEC was notable in several respects. Mr. Schlesinger bucked the pressure of the atomic energy establishment to insist that the AEC take note of and respond to the claims of its ecological critics. And he attempted to push the agency back from its political role toward the more disinterested service role it was meant in the first place to fulfill. He, like Mr. Helms, is demonstrably a man of talent, dedication and impressive intellect. We should have been content to see them stay on in their present jobs. But if Mr. Helms is to leave the Central Intelligence Agency, we think Mr. Schlesinger is a first class choice to replace him.

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It's official: Schlesinger new CIA head

By Thomas B. Ross
Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON -- The White House announced Thursday that Atomic Energy Commission Chairman James R. Schlesinger will replace Richard M. Helms as director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The announcement was made in Key Biscayne, Fla.

Press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler said President Nixon intends to nominate Helms as ambassador to Iran.

The Sun-Times disclosed the Schlesinger appointment three weeks ago and reported Helms' transfer to Iran in its Thursday editions.

Ziegler portrayed Helms' de-

parture from the CIA as voluntary. He said Helms told Mr. Nixon he wanted to abide by a policy he established that CIA officials retire at age 60. Helms will be 60 in March.

On the other hand, friends and associates of Helms indicated he was leaving the agency reluctantly after 25 years of intelligence work.

Ziegler conceded there had been some differences over Helms' assessment of Soviet missile deployment and the North Vietnamese offensive last spring. But he insisted it would be "off the mark" to suggest any White House unhappiness with Helms.

He praised Helms' "dedicated service" and said the

White House was "totally satisfied" with his performance.

In disclosing the Schlesinger appointment on Dec. 2, The Sun-Times reported that national security affairs adviser Henry A. Kissinger had directed a series of complaints against the CIA's work under Helms, particularly about its intelligence reports prior to the North Vietnamese offensive.

There have also been indications that Mr. Nixon felt Helms had not kept a tight enough rein on the CIA's spending. Schlesinger, former assistant director of the Office of Management and Budget, will be expected to enforce greater financial discipline on

the \$5 billion a year budget of the CIA and the other intelligence agencies.

Schlesinger, 43, is a native of New York City and a summa cum laude graduate of Harvard where he also took his PhD.

He was named head of the AEC last year and quickly came under criticism by both the environment and oil lobbies for promoting nuclear power plants.

Helms, who was named head of the CIA in 1966, is a career intelligence operative who moved to the agency on its inception in 1947 after wartime service in the Office of Strategic Services.

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THE BOOK REPORT

Ex-Agent Blows CIA Image

BY LEWIS YABLONSKY

CIA: The Myth and the Madness by Patrick J. McGarvey (Saturday Review Press: \$6.95)

The CIA has generally created an image of daring, competent, resourceful and well-armed men, darting through exotic alleys, living in lush hotels, in countries around the world in pursuit of information vital to the nation's security.

This image is totally blown by this comprehensive look at the CIA, written by a man who was an

Times Book critic Robert Kirch is on vacation. Today's guest reviewer is Lewis Yablonsky.

agent assigned to a variety of posts for 14 years. From McGarvey's point of view: "The intelligence community is a bureaucratic morass, a fragmented, disjointed effort in which no one seems responsible for momentous decisions, where vested interests are coldly played off against one another, where men of varied expertise stifle the unorthodox and opt for wretched half-measures of compromises so weakened by consensus that they would be better not taken at all."

He details the broad parameters of incompetence and the absurd. For example, in one adventuresome chapter of the CIA, he describes how a team of agents stole a sample of King Feroz's urine. Their object was to determine Feroz's state of health.

Liver Samples

In another slightly more dignified project, a CIA friend of McGarvey assigned to Hong Kong roundly collected liver samples from cattle raised on mainland China. These were bought from an old woman butcher in a Hong Kong slaughterhouse. The

liver was packed in dry ice and shipped to Washington. The purpose was to detect nuclear fallout over mainland China.

The CIA has, according to McGarvey, often provided ridiculous and costly intelligence; as for example in the planning of

the American raids on the Son Tay Prisoner of War Camp in North Vietnam. Acting on CIA intelligence, the American Army, with the approval of the secretary of defense and President Nixon, stormed this prison camp to free American prisoners. It proved to be one of America's most ridiculous blunders -- since there were no American prisoners in Son Tay.

Kennedy Aura

Another deadly blunder of CIA intelligence was their erroneous assessments of the strength of the Vietnamese Communist forces in South Vietnam. The CIA provided information that had a direct influence on American military strategy and, ultimately, on the number of American lives lost in Vietnam. According to McGarvey, "Had the problem been handled intelligently, about 20,000 American lives could have been spared."

McGarvey began his work for the CIA during an optimistic period in its

and the country's history. "This was the time of the aura of John Kennedy; the rhetoric; the glitter of Schlesingers, Hilsenrath and Galbraith; the gay poolside parties and the glamor of Georgetown; mad government service in Washington, the only respectable place for young men to be after college and service hitches. I cried at J.F.K.'s inaugural address. His 'Ask not what your country can do for you' grabbed me and hundreds of guys like me."

It took 14 years for him to arrive at a point of despair and disgust with the system and his job in it. He saw the phenomenon of the "burned-out" intelligence officer, or the spy who came in from the cold, as a real problem that was accepted blandly as part of the game. "Bureaucracy, conformity, and paper mill are more meaningful power phrases to an intelligent professional than *coup d'etat*, clandestine operations, or even spy."